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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This  note  looks  at  the  dilemmas  faced  in  the  application  of  conditions  on 
governance by the international financial institutions (IFI) in the course of their lending 
operations in member states. Governance relates to the activities of governments and 
other public sector entities in the exercise of their financial and regulatory functions and 
that bear directly on the proper use of funds provided by the IFI. Given the extensive 
range  of  state  action,  conditions  relating  to  governance  can  apply  to  diverse  areas, 
including  the  allocation  of  public  expenditures  and  the  collection  of  taxes,  the  rules 
affecting procurement of goods and services by public authorities, the effectiveness of the 
judicial  system  in  enforcing  contracts  and  the  arbitration  of  claims  and  obligations 
between governments and all the social entities they deal with. 
Given  the  vast  range  of  transactions  that  can  be  affected  by  governance 
conditionality, the issue has been a contentious one and has attracted stronger reactions 
from  member-governments  and  the  general  public  than  has  been  the  case  with  the 
traditional conditionalities applied by the IFI for two reasons. First, it has been harder to 
prove that the conditions bear directly on the successful outcome of particular projects or 
programmes; second, it has been argued that developing countries are being asked to 
show results in the governance area in a fraction of the time taken by advanced nations 
and on the basis of a model that might be appropriate for the major shareholders of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) but is unsuitable for many developing countries. 
This is the dilemma with which  both member-governments and the IFIs’ have  to 
grapple with  on the governance issue. On the one hand, the IFIs are  responding to an 
increasing recognition of the importance of good governance for the successful outcome 
of their lending operations; they are also aware of   a growing resistance on the part of 
their principal shareholders/donors to providing debt relief and concessional resources for  
countries where governments are seen by them as not fully accountable to their citizens, 
where decision making processes are opaque, and where a high degree of corruption 
prevails. On the other hand, borrowing governments, while naturally anxious to improve 
their creditworthiness credentials, find their willingness to accept governance conditions 
circumscribed by apprehensions of a “backlash” generated by a public perception that  
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they  are acceding to the “dictates” of external agencies, rather than  pursuing their own 
initiatives for good governance.  
II.  EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITIES 
While the IMF has, from quite early years, applied extensive conditions on the 
promotion of macroeconomic stability in the context of fostering balance of payments 
viability, it has begun to apply governance conditions more recently than has been the 
case with the Multilateral Development Banks (MDB). To start with, MDB conditionality 
was applied in the form of loan covenants to specific projects and was justified as bearing 
directly on the project’s success. This justification could be extended to environmental 
conditions when these began to be applied from the mid-1980s, on the basis that the 
development process could   be sustainable only if the environment is protected. Even 
when structural adjustment lending gained a substantial share of IFI lending in the late 
1980s, its broader conditionality usually applied in the same areas as were a staple of 
IMF conditionality. It was possible to justify their use by the MDBs, especially when 
their  programmes  became  part  and  parcel  of  the  “Policy  Framework  Paper  (PFP) 
process” in which the BWI worked together to establish the terms and conditions of 
structural adjustment loans. 
However, a transformation from macroeconomic into governance conditionality  
began  when  IFI  reviews  of  investment  programmes  were  extended  into  public 
expenditure reviews, and then into public expenditure ceilings, as part of fiscal deficit 
reduction  programmes.  With  growing  IMF/MDB  insistence  during  the  1990s  on  the 
desirability of enlarging social sector expenditures, the manner in which macroeconomic 
conditionality was applied could be construed as a not-too-subtle means of influencing 
sovereign decisions on governance relating to the allocation of domestic public spending. 
The  emphasis  on  governance  became  more  explicit  after  the  establishment  of  the 
European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  (EBRD)  in  1990.  Its  charter 
prescribes in its preamble that borrowing members were committed to the “fundamental 
principles of multiparty democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and market 
economics”.  While  these  desiderata  were  meant  to  apply  to  the  EBRD  clientele  of 
formerly  centrally  planned  socialist  countries  in  eastern  and  Central  Europe  and  the 
former Soviet Union, it was not long before similar conditions began to appear in the 
context of financial relations with developing countries. The Loma-IV Convention, for 
instance, incorporated several references to human rights in its preamble, and UNDP and 
other UN agencies, especially after the Copenhagen Social Summit of March 1995, began 
to advocate “good government” issues in their work. 
Next came the Report of the Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks,
1 
which emphasised the importance of “more effective government and the emergence of 
strong civil society”. It asserted a strong relationship between “good public sector policy 
and  economic  activities  and  interests,  government’s  accountability  to  its  citizens, 
effective  measures  to  curb  corruption,  a  participatory  approach  to  development,  easy 
access to important services, and sound decision making reflecting the actual needs of 
people”. The Report concluded that the “the MDBs should help create and maintain such  
1Serving  A  Changing  World  (Final  Report,  Development  Committee  Task  Force  on  Multilateral 
Development Banks (DC/96-01). IFI Conditionality on Governance   567
an environment while being at once sensitive and determined”. In commenting on the 
Report,  the  World  Bank  stated  that  “the  Bank  is  now  actively  promoting  good 
governance, not only in traditional public administration areas but in strengthening legal 
systems, helping governments improve their public communication capability on difficult 
economic  development  issues,  increasing  participation,  and  responding  to  many 
government requests for help on decentralisation”.
2  
The World Bank’s work on good governance has since expanded to the regional 
development banks. In a significant recent development, presumably connected to the 
institutions’  work  on  anti-money  laundering  and  the  combating   the  financing  of 
terrorism,  the  IMF   joined  the  MDBs’  on  an  agreement  for  combating  fraud  and 
corruption that was announced during the 2006 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings in 
Singapore. This agreement, while concerned with policies and procedures for the sharing 
of information and discussion among the IFIs’, carries the potential of becoming the 
prism  through  which  conditionality  will  be  viewed  by  their  member-governments  in 
future.
3   
III.  BACKLASH EFFECTS 
As  noted  earlier,  governance  conditionality  attracts  strong  reaction  from  the 
general public and, in particular, from vested interest that are beneficiaries of governance 
deficiencies,  especially  when  these  have  persisted  for  any  length  of  time.  Anti-
government  campaigns  launched  by  interest  groups  are  more  apt  to  attract  general 
support  when  there  is  an  element  of  truth  to  the  charge  that  but  for  a  governance 
condition laid down by an external lending agency, a project would have moved faster 
and/or could have been completed at lower cost if the government was simply following 
its own agenda of good governance.  Similar difficulties arise when IFIs’ seek to bring 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) into their project preparation process. In many 
instances,  NGOs  can  serve  a  valuable  countervailing  social  interest  by  empowering 
weaker elements in the society against the overbearing influence of local élites. However, 
in many developing country contexts, NGOs can, just as easily, become instruments, 
advertent  or  otherwise,  in  the  hands  of  the  same  elite  interests  when  opposing  a 
government  initiative.  It  is  easier  to  attack  an  IFI  for  giving  ear  to  foreign  NGOs. 
Oftentimes, NGOs in industrial countries tend to be single-issue advocates, and their 
ability  to  bring  influence  to  bear  on  their  own  governments  to  apply  conditions  on 
bilateral assistance programmes is extended to IFIs when these agencies seek funding for 
concessional resource from legislative bodies in donor countries. 
The  governance  conditionality  advocated  by  foreign  NGOs  can  raise  sensitive 
foreign and domestic policy and security issues and create obstacles to implementation 
inside the borrowing country, e.g., if those officials that negotiate with the IFIs are seen 
to  be  trespassing  beyond  their  traditional  jurisdictions.  Often  these  NGOs  seek  to  
2Comment on the Task Force Report (DC/96-6). 
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superimpose their own cultural values on societies subscribing to different ethical and 
spiritual  values.  Consequently,  such  governance  conditions  are  seen  as  imposing  the 
ideological  or  cultural  preferences  of  advocacy  groups  in  the  industrial  countries  on 
borrowers,  thereby  inviting  the  charge  that  the  IFIs’  are  being  made  to  serve  as 
instruments of rich-country paternalism, especially in their dealings with poorer member 
countries, who must depend on the concessional windows of the IFIs for funding. Great 
care has to be exercised by the IFIs to ensure that the participation of NGOs, whether 
foreign  or  local,  does  not  encroach  upon  areas  of  responsibility  assigned  to  state 
institutions under the respective constitutional arrangements of borrowing countries or 
intrude into the development of direct relations between governments and their own civil 
society organisations, including local NGOs.  
IV.  DIFFICULTIES IFIs FACE IN APPLYING THE 
GOVERNANCE CONDITIONALITY 
Managing their interaction with the NGO community is not the only, or even 
the most pressing, issue confronting the IFIs in applying governance conditionality. 
A fundamental question is how to reconcile the nonpolitical mandate of the IFIs with 
the application of conditions that are likely to push them into the domestic political 
arena.
4  An  example  of  IFI  conditionality  in  post-conflict  situations  (e.g.,  Angola, 
Guatemala,  Nicaragua)  requires  the government  to  adhere to  the terms of  a  peace 
accord. Since the protection of human rights is typically written into such accords, 
the IFIs become embroiled in domestic disputes when political opponents charge that 
their rights are being violated by the government, in contravention of the terms of the 
peace accords. 
Another  difficulty  arises  because  monitoring  compliance  with  governance 
conditions inevitably calls for subjective judgments on the part of the IFIs, much beyond 
what they have had to deal with in the past. Deciding where and how to draw the line 
between  the technical and political dimensions of  governance conditions requires the 
staff  to  reach  unambiguous  conclusions  about  situations  or  outcomes  that  are  often 
ambiguous. Working on governance issues entails a broadening of IFI contacts beyond 
normal governmental (executive) channels.
5 This means not only extending attention to 
elements  of  the  administrative  machinery  beyond  the  usual  circle  of  the  officials  in 
planning and finance ministries as well as central banks, but also to other organs of the 
state,  i.e.  with  the  judiciary  or  with  the  parliamentarians  (e.g.,  where  deadlines  for 
legislative  enactments  are  involved).  Such  contacts  carry  risks  that  politicians  would 
associate the IFIs with the government in power, leaving them exposed to attack when 
governments change.  
4Section 10, Article IV of the IBRD Articles of Agreement stipulate that “the Bank and its officers shall 
not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political 
character  of  the  member  or  members  concerned.  Only  economic  considerations  shall  be  relevant  to  their 
decisions”. Section 1(g), Article V of the IDA Charter uses identical language and adds that IDA pay “due 
attention to considerations of economy, efficiency and competititive international trade and without regard to 
political or other non-economic influence or considerations” (italics supplied). 
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There  is  another,  deeper  risk:  that  of  non-discriminatory  treatment  among 
borrowing  members.  The  governance  agenda  substantially  raises  the  political  cost  of 
borrowing but, in practice, it does so quite unequally. Larger borrowers are better able to 
“finesse” the implementation of some of the new conditions; their application affects 
mostly the smaller and poorer countries that have little or no access to private sources of 
funding  and  depend  on  highly  concessional  terms  for  their  foreign  borrowing.  The 
resulting discriminatory treatment has two serious implications: firstly, the loan portfolio 
of the IFIs’ tends to be skewed away from stronger towards weaker borrowers, thereby 
impairing,  or  threatening  to  impair,  their  creditworthiness;  secondly,  the  governance 
conditions are applied mostly to governments that are already struggling to govern, and 
the conditions erode their credibility with their own people, if they are suspected, or 
accused,  of  accepting  conditions  out  of  financial  exigency  rather  than  from  any 
conviction as to their suitability in their prevailing circumstances. This loss of credibility 
feeds back into the “backlash” problem. 
Finally, there arises an issue of evenhandedness, as between creditor and debtor 
Governments, especially when applying conditions relating to corruption, While many of 
the  causes  of  corruption  inhere  in  domestic  conditions,  corruption  in  the  award  of 
contracts for the supply of goods and services always involves two parties; the corrupter 
is apt to be a supplier, typically located in an advanced country, sometimes sheltering 
under a “tied aid” arrangement or relying on the domestic procurement requirements of 
an  official  export  credit  agency.  In  such  cases,  the  application  of  anti-corruption 
conditions only to the procurement process in the borrowing country raises issues of 
legitimacy and fair dealing. The IFIs’ are seen to have little power over suppliers in 
donor/creditor  countries  that  offer  financial  inducements  to  buyers  in  the  borrowing 
countries, especially where such “marketing commissions” can be written off as ordinary 
business expenses under the tax regimes of the supplier country. Although members of 
the  OECD  ratified  in  1999  the  Convention  on  Combating  Bribery  of  Foreign  Public 
Officials  in  International  Business  Transactions  that  makes  it  a  criminal  offense  for 
companies  to  bribe  foreign  government  officials,  there  has  been  little  success  with 
enforcing that agreement
6  and in many instances advanced country governments have 
failed to put in place in their own countries the kind of transparent public procurement 
approach that their aid agencies press for in developing countries.   This failure, on the 
part of the major supplying countries, places the IFIs in a difficult moral position when 
applying governance conditions that constitute a “double standard” in their dealing with 
their members.   
V.  REDUCING BACKLASH EFFECTS 
There is clearly a tension inhering in the application of governance conditionality 
that needs to be handled carefully. How to manage this tension becomes one of the most  
6An OECD evaluation of the UK’s record on combating bribery stated that: it is surprising that no 
company or individual has been indicted or tried for the offence of bribing a foreign official in the six years 
since  the  Convention  was  ratified.  The  example  is  quoted  by  Susanna  Mitchell  of  the  New  Economics 
Foundation in commenting on a decision taken by the UK Prime Minister ordering the country’s Serious Fraud 
Office  to  drop  their  inquiry  into  the  Al-Yamama  arms  deal  between  BAE  Systems  and  Saudi  Arabia  
(20/12/2006).  For  other  examples  of  assymmetric  application,  see  Frank  Vogl  Letter  to  Financial  Times 
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difficult issues confronting the IFIs when dealing with corruption. At one extreme is a 
position, initially espoused by World Bank President Wolfowitz, to cut off dealing with 
any member-country that countenances widespread corruption. Such an action is patently 
unworkable in most cases, simply because the IFI is typically in “mid-stream” with its 
members, being in the midst of a chain of transactions, on some of which it is disbursing 
funds  (which  could  presumably  be  suspended)  and  others  in  respect  of  which  it  is 
receiving  repayments,  on  which  the  borrowing  government  could  suspend  its  debt 
servicing. Moreover, this extreme posture forecloses the possibility of influencing the 
course of reform in  many situations. Governments are rarely monolithic entities, and 
there are contending forces within each of them. The influence of any external agency is 
exercised primarily through alliances (mostly implicit, hardly ever overt) with domestic 
groups that are seeking to improve governance and whose hands are strengthened by the 
promise  of  external  funding.  To  withdraw  altogether  from  dealing  with  certain 
governments thus becomes a counsel of despair, rather than a pragmatic way of pursuing 
good governance objectives, except in the most extreme of situations.  
In seeking governance objectives, the IFIs’ have to be highly selective in targeting 
efforts to areas that offer the promise of yielding tangible results in a reasonable period of 
time.  This  calls  for  a  fairly  deep  understanding  of  the  governance  situation  in  each 
country and a willingness to adapt the conditionality to the individual country situation, 
rather  than  seeking  uniformity  of  prescription  across  member  countries.  Once  these 
targeted  areas  are  selected  in  agreement  with  the  authorities  of  the  borrowing 
government,  the  IFIs  must  be  willing  to  commit  substantial  resources,  by  way  of 
technical and financial assistance, for capacity building and other improvements in the 
selected sectors, and to allow sufficient time for results to emerge. 
While IFIs’ normally work with national government entities , an approach that 
might yield better results in the governance area involves working with lower levels of 
government in a typical area of corruption, namely, the transfer of property rights in 
urban land plots and zoning for commercial land uses; the gains to those able to acquire 
land rights or zoning variances through state action tend to be enormous, given the fact 
that in most of the larger cities in the developing world, land values tend to match, if not 
exceed, those in many developed countries. Funding for machinery at the municipal level 
to register mutations and transfers of property rights, and to ensure speedy access to land 
records and zoning approvals, might be a constructive method of tackling a major area of 
misgovernance.   
It is notable that many governments have regulations on the books for exercising 
budgetary discipline over spending, for competitive bidding on procurement contracts, 
for proper auditing of fiscal transactions, etc. It is lack of full compliance with such 
regulations, more often than their absence, that creates some of the governance problems 
in  the  public  sector,  especially  in  the  management  of  state  enterprises.  Governance 
conditions that support better compliance would have greater public acceptability (and 
less danger of public misapprehension) if tied to existing regulations and laws already 
“on the books”, instead of requiring new legislation to fulfill IFI conditions. 
Past efforts have been made by IFIs’ through technical assistance extended in such 
areas as public administration, privatising of state-owned enterprises, and the reform of 
fiscal and financial systems, with varying degrees of success. It is important to derive IFI Conditionality on Governance   571
lessons from these experiences to find out what succeeds and why. Equally important is 
that the IFIs’ exercise utmost caution in claiming credit for success associated with the 
application of governance conditionality. They must remain ever mindful of their non-
political mandates and not allow any “public relations” concerns of their own, or of their 
industrial  country  shareholders,  into  appearing  to  be  acting  in  discriminatory  ways, 
especially  in  relation  to  their  smaller  and  poorer  member-countries  that  depend  on 
consessional funds for their development. 